



I do not know Michael Stokes Paulsen or his writings, but I will do my best
to reply to his gracious and elegantly impartial review. His absolute refusal to
engage in sycophancy should be a model to us all. I cannot imagine why he
likens himself to "a skunk."'
It is difficult, however, to respond to objections to your work when the
objector repeatedly objects to the exact opposite of what you are saying.
Consider, for example, what Paulsen says about Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell.2
Blaisdell is important because it is one of the very few cases of modern
constitutional law-perhaps the only one -in which the Supreme Court seems
to explicitly repudiate a foundational Application Understanding. Blaisdell
therefore stands as a counterexample to the pattern I describe as otherwise
ubiquitous in constitutional law. Despite this, and even though the central
thesis of my book is that courts must inviolably adhere to foundational
Application Understandings, Paulsen says I "accept[]" the decision.'
According to Paulsen, I say that Blaisdell, even though it violated a
foundational Application Understanding, is a "'widely admired decision' and
should be understood as creating a new interpretive paradigm-a new
constitutional commitment, as it were."'4 My endorsement of Blaisdell is
supposed to look bad when contrasted, as Paulsen contrasts it,' with my
arguing in other contexts against judges violating foundational Application
1. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (And How Not To), 115 YALE L.J.
2037, 2040 (2006).
2. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
3- Paulsen, supra note i, at 2037, 2054 & n.39.
4. Id. at 2054.
5. Id. at 2055.
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Understandings. And I guess my endorsing Blaisdell would be pretty
embarrassing-if I had endorsed it.
It is true that, on page sixty-seven of my book, I say that Blaisdell "is a
widely admired decision."6 It is also true that on page sixty-eight, at the
conclusion of the very same paragraph, I say that Blaisdell-if in fact it does
repudiate a foundational Application Understanding-"is wrong and should be
overturned."
7
Very few readers would view "is wrong and should be overturned" as
"acceptance." For the record, nowhere in my book do I say that Blaisdell
"creat[ed] ...a new constitutional commitment."' The whole point of my
entire argument, as any minimally competent reader-without some peculiar
axe to grind-would know, is that a decision abandoning a foundational
Application Understanding violates a constitutional commitment.
Or consider the opening of Paulsen's "review," which takes issue with the
opening of my book. I begin Revolution by Judiciary by contrasting
constitutional law with statutory and administrative law, where the Supreme
Court has at least in principle established legally authoritative interpretive rules
and protocols that lower court judges are supposed to follow when construing
statutes or regulations.' By contrast, I point out, there are "no official
interpretive rules" of constitutional interpretation.10 While there is a law of
statutory and regulatory interpretation, "[t]here is no law of constitutional
interpretation."" I write, "Incredibly, American constitutional case law has
almost nothing to say about what judges are supposed to be doing when they
go about the business of interpreting the Constitution. " "
Paulsen, calling this "nonsense," says:
If there is a problem with constitutional law today, it surely is not that it
has "almost nothing to say" about how to "go about the business of
interpreting the Constitution." It is that it has far too much to say! Our
cases, our practice, and our theorists point in wildly different
directions, offer and illustrate competing interpretive theories, and
reveal a cacophony of voices virtually screaming for attention ...
6. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JuDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 67 (2005).
7. Id. at 68.
8. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 2054.
9. RUBENFELD, supra note 6, at 4-5.
1o. Id. at 5.
ii. Id.
12. Id. at 4.
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Surely Rubenfeld jests. We suffer not from a deficit but a surfeit of
constitutional theory.
3
There are so many foolish errors in this paragraph it's hard to know where
to begin. I will focus on the two most important.
First, the subject of my sentence was "American constitutional case law."
When Paulsen reads the term "case law," he evidently thinks it includes
"theorists." It does not. Everyone knows that constitutional theorists have a
great deal to say about how judges should interpret the Constitution. But when
I say "case law," I mean case law. There are plenty of theories of constitutional
interpretation; it remains true, however, that "[t]here is no law of
constitutional interpretation."
Second, as to everything else in his paragraph, Paulsen seems to think that
restating my point counts as refuting it. Of course the cases "point in wildly
different directions." Of course they "offer and illustrate competing
interpretive theories." I never said constitutional law lacks exemplars of
different interpretive approaches. I said (in the sentence immediately preceding
the one Paulsen criticizes) that the case law "lacks an accepted account" of
interpretation. 14 I said (on the very next page) that the whole problem with
current constitutional case law is that the cases are so all-over-the-map
interpretively that practitioners can argue from "text, precedent, original
meaning, morality, tradition, structure, and so on," but "there is no knowing
why or whether or when or in what priority these 'modalities' of argument will
be considered in any given case."" How could a minimally competent reader
think he had objected to this point by saying that the existing cases "offer and
illustrate competing interpretive theories"?
"There is no law of constitutional interpretation": It is logically impossible
to read this statement as denying the existence of "theorists" espousing
different views of constitutional interpretation. "Under current case law, judges
are fully authorized" to "rely[] on" or to "ignor[e] original intent"": A first-
year law student would understand that this sentence does not deny, but rather
asserts, the fact that the cases offer competing interpretive theories.
"Practitioners know they can argue from text, precedent, original meaning,
morality, tradition, structure, and so on," but "there is no knowing why or
whether or when or in what priority" judges will accept these arguments: No
13. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 2053-54.
14. RUBENFELD, supra note 6, at 4.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
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reasonable person would think he had objected to this proposition by
exclaiming that "our practice .. points in wildly different directions." 7
There is little point responding to a "review" so manifestly unable or
unwilling to follow relatively simple arguments. Therefore I am going to skip
over the rest of what Paulsen says about my book and offer a word about what
he says of his own approach.
Paulsen describes himself as an originalist who believes in "read[ing] the
text carefully and faithfully.' 8 I leave it to readers to judge whether Paulsen
has demonstrated a capacity to read a text carefully.
He seems to think he scores points for his version of originalism by saying
he is against "grand theories" of constitutional interpretation. 9 This is just
vacuous rhetoric.
Originalism is of course a theory of constitutional interpretation. Perhaps it
is not very grand intellectually. But originalism is indeed "grand" if "grand"
implies, as I suppose it is meant to do, that the theory rests on a large
philosophy of some kind (whether political, linguistic, or something else) that
in turn rests on fundamental (and controversial) premises concerning the
status, purpose, and legitimacy of constitutional law. To be sure, originalists
may not like having to explicate and defend the foundations of their theories,
but that does not make their theories less grand. It merely makes them half-
baked.
Consider Paulsen's particular brand of originalism. He purports to reject
"crude intentionalism."2  Original meaning, says Paulsen, is properly
understood to be the "objective linguistic meaning of the words of a text (in
historical context),"21 as distinct from any "subjective," "concrete historical
understandings"" of the text, including any "historical beliefs" about the
applicability of the text in specific settings. 3
This position is either incoherent or fundamentally misguided or both.
It is of course conceptually possible to divorce the "objective linguistic
meaning" of uttered words from the subjective, concrete historical
understandings of those words held by the people who wrote or spoke them.
What we might call the "semantic content" of words, derived from the
17. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 2053.
18. Id. at 2o61.
19. Id. at 2056-58.
20. Id. at 2059.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002)).
23. Id. at 2060 & n.43.
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linguistic rules of the relevant community, can always differ from the speaker's
or author's "intended meaning." People often employ words whose semantic
content (in the above sense) differs slightly or significantly from their intended
meaning. When we hear such words, we always have a choice in principle
between interpreting them according to their semantic content or their
intended meaning. Paulsen wants to say that only by following the original
linguistic meaning can interpreters interpret correctly, remaining faithful to the
actual written law as opposed to creating new law. 4
The fallacy in this thinking is easy to demonstrate. A recipe says "flour"
where "sugar" may have been intended. An interpreter of this recipe can
certainly choose to use flour, saying "flour means flour, and it meant flour at
the time the recipe was written." The words "means" and "meant" in this
declaration would refer to the semantic content of the word -derived from the
general rules and usage of English-which in this case (let's suppose) is not
open to doubt. But someone else trying to follow the recipe could always say,
"I think the writers of this recipe may have meant sugar." He may then pursue
a "crude intentionalism" and try to uncover the authors' actual subjective
historical understandings. If he discovers that sugar was in fact intended, he
will say, "See -they did mean sugar," and use sugar.
In the case of a recipe, it would probably be stupid to use objective
linguistic meaning when it is known to contravene intended meaning. In any
event, whether stupid or merely adventurous, using linguistic meaning would
in an important sense not be faithful to the original recipe. It would produce a
new recipe.
What is true of a miswritten recipe is not, of course, necessarily true of a
constitution. There may be good reasons to follow historical linguistic meaning
in constitutional law when linguistic meaning departs from widely shared,
well-understood concrete historical understandings. But one thing that cannot
be said in favor of doing so is that following linguistic meaning will not
produce "new" law.
24. Id. at 2o61. Others fall into the equivalent but opposite error, insisting that texts can be
correctly interpreted only in accordance with the intended meaning and denying the
possibility of interpretation according to any "semantic meaning" other than the intended
meaning. See, e.g., Paul Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178, 2189 n.25
(1996) (claiming that "the semantic meaning of a text is identical to the [communicative]
intentions of its author, and it follows from this that the correct interpretation of a text is
always the act of successfully determining those intentions"); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn
Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW
PRAGMATISM 11 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985).
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There is an excellent example of this point in Robert Bork's The Tempting of
America.25 Like Paulsen, Bork tries to defend an originalism that casts aside the
actual concrete historical understandings of the Constitution in favor of a
supposed objective meaning of the text. He does so in an effort to make
originalism safe for Brown v. Board of Education.
Yes, Bork admirably concedes, "those who ratified the amendment did not
think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of life. "26
Nevertheless, Bork asserts, Brown could "have clearly been rooted in the
original understanding."27 How? Well, "equality and segregation were
mutually inconsistent, though the framers did not understand that," says Bork,
and "equality, not separation, was written into the text.,,28
In other words, the subjective understanding of the ratifiers - their concrete
historical understandings -were out of whack with the objective meaning of
the words written into the text. Equality means equality; this is not
anachronistic; equality meant equality in the 186os; equality was written into
the text; segregation is unequal; hence segregated public schools are
unconstitutional. Paulsen indicates that he essentially agrees with this analysis:
"[T]he result in Brown . . . makes entire sense if one focuses on the original
linguistic meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the mistaken
subjective views or expectations of some individuals at the time that the
Amendment's principle did not extend to segregated education."
29
The problem is not that Brown cannot be squared with the original
linguistic meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course it can. The
problem is that a great many other things can too. An originalism that cuts
anchor with concrete historical understandings in this way can no longer
coherently present itself as originalism.
The one virtue of originalism was that it purported to offer determinate,
demonstrable answers to real constitutional controversies. Does the Eighth
Amendment ban the death penalty? "Of course not," an originalist could say;
"I can easily prove to you that it was not so understood at the time of
enactment. Any contrary reading by the Court today would therefore be a
usurpation - government by judiciary."
25. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990).
26. Id. at 75-76.
27. Id. at 82.
28. Id.
29. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 2o6o.
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But when originalism cuts anchor with concrete historical understandings,
the death penalty's unconstitutionality certainly could be "rooted in the
original understanding." "Capital punishment was inconsistent with
abolishing cruel and unusual punishment," a Borkian originalist judge could
say, "though the framers did not understand that, and the bar on cruel and
unusual punishments was written into the text." Even a Marxist judge could
now be an originalist: "Private property and equality were mutually
inconsistent, though the framers did not understand that, and equality was
written into the text." Or how about abortion? "Roe v. Wade makes entire sense
if one focuses on the original linguistic meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of 'involuntary servitude,' rather than on the
mistaken subjective views or expectations of some individuals at the time that
the amendment's principle did not extend to laws banning abortion."
Nothing in the objective linguistic meaning of "cruel and unusual" in the
178os or "involuntary servitude" in the 186os-when considered at a level of
generality that excludes reference to concrete historical understandings -blocks
the conclusion that the death penalty or a ban on abortion is unconstitutional.
What prevents a clear-thinking originalist from reaching these conclusions is
not the objective linguistic meaning. It is rather, precisely, a set of concrete
historical understandings, consisting of the "subjective" views or expectations
of a great many individuals at the time concerning the applicability of the text
in specific settings.
As soon as an originalist starts saying that the framers' and ratifiers'
concrete historical understandings of a constitutional provision were
"mistaken" and may therefore be ignored in favor of the semantic or objective
linguistic meaning of the words at the time of enactment, he is no longer an
originalist but a Dworkinian. Dworkin's distinction between "concept" and
"conception" (with Dworkin claiming to honor the concept as opposed to the
conception) tracks very closely, if it is not identical to, a distinction between the
original semantic meaning of the words in the text and the concrete historical
understandings of how that text would apply to particular cases.30
Proper interpretation of constitutional terms like "the equal protection of
the laws" or "involuntary servitude" starts not from objective linguistic
meaning, but from concrete historical understandings: namely, from the
foundational paradigm cases. That's what gives the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment their core meaning, and that core meaning properly structures all
subsequent Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. Many of our
30. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 75-76 (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-46 (1977).
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constitutional guarantees are like this: They take their core meaning from
historical paradigm cases.
The account of constitutional interpretation that I give in my book captures
this phenomenon and explains it. Neither a Dworkinian account of
interpretation, nor an account based on objective linguistic meaning that
repudiates Americans' concrete historical understandings of the provision they
were enacting into the Constitution, ever can.
As to Professor Powell's commentary, I can only say that his criticisms of
some parts of my book are quite well-taken, and that his praise of other parts is
very kind and probably undeserved.
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